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30 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Strategic Research
SUBJECT : Intelligence Representation on VPWG
REFERENCE : Gen. Faurer's letter to Mr. Lehman
on this subject, dtd 20 Aug 76

1. We believe that General Faurer's proposal to substitute the NIO for CIA on the Verification Panel Working Group for MBFR should be rejected. General Faurer bases his recommendation on the proposition that all draft intelligence contributions to the VPWG should be coordinated with DIA (and presumably with State/INR?). The arguments against this are as follows:

- DIA and INR are already adequately represented on the VPWG (MBFR). The DoD MBFR Task Force, which has a seat on the VPWG, includes a section of DIA personnel. Bob Baraz of INR regularly attends VPWG meetings and addresses the VPWG without inhibition. It might also be noted that DIA has an additional vote for its point of view through the JCS member.
- The VPWG is better served by the present arrangement whereby it initially receives the views of all agencies on issues, with any necessary coordination being worked out later. This process has worked with minimal friction in most cases. (An exception is noted below.)
- The present mode of operation in the VPWG is, in any case, dictated by the NSC Staff

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which specifies tasking of the various member agencies, indicating when it does or does not desire coordinated submissions. We have invariably followed the NSC Staff guidance to the best of our ability. By the way, NSC Staff deadlines are frequently too short to permit coordination of initial drafts.

- Those intelligence contributions in which agreed CIA/DIA views are essential, e.g., order of battle data which are to be used in negotiations by the US MBFR Delegation or which are to be sent to NATO Headquarters, are invariably coordinated by CIA and DIA on the margin of the direct VPWG process.

2. As to the specific cases, General Faurer cites what he alleges are examples of improper CIA actions in its role as a member of the Verification Panel Working Groups. Examination of the second and third of these indicates the existence of misunderstanding and--in the third instance--of misinformation.

3. The "CIA Draft Paper on US Data on Pact Forces" was prepared in response to a relatively short-deadline request levied by the NSC Staff specifically on the CIA. As is customary, a first draft of the paper was submitted to other VPWG members for comments prior to anticipated discussion of the paper at a VPWG meeting. A courtesy copy was also sent to DIA, which would also have received it via the DoD. In the event, the VPWG addressed the paper only briefly, and it has not requested a second draft. Nor has CIA received comments on it from DIA.


4. The CIA memo "The Military Situation: Past, Present, and Future" resulted from CIA's vain attempt to prepare, with the DoD, a joint contribution to the MBFR special study. The NSC Staff requested that the DoD and CIA work together to draft a paper assessing the military balance in Europe. An OSR officer contacted the DoD representative and proposed that CIA prepare the portion related to the Warsaw Pact, that the DoD describe NATO forces, and that the two parties

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then agree on text characterizing the current and projected balance. The DoD representative agreed with apparent enthusiasm.

5. The DoD representative ignored this arrangement, however, and the DoD's separate appraisal of the overall military situation was drafted and forwarded to the NSC Staff without notice to CIA. The Staff found the contribution unsatisfactory and repeated its request for CIA participation. OSR recontacted the DoD representative, asked for the DoD paper on NATO forces, but was told that none had been written. OSR then added to its original draft an assessment of NATO forces and of the Warsaw Pact-NATO balance, thus producing the draft memo General Faurer has cited.

6. OSR furnished it to the DoD representative, not "with a request that it be altered in no way" (as the DoD representative evidently informed General Faurer), but with the suggestion that it be used as a sort of stalking horse in a joint drafting effort to reach a mutually agreed text. The DoD representative refused, insisting that the basic text be that material to which the NSC had already objected, and that CIA's projection of a continued rough military balance in Europe was unacceptable. In the face of this fundamental disagreement, OSR representatives finally abandoned their effort to achieve a joint paper.


Chief
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I. Role of DCI

- o President's Primary Advisor on Foreign Intelligence
- o Chairman of Committee on Foreign Intelligence
- o Executive Head of CIA and Leader of Intelligence Community
- o Dual Deputy and Respective Responsibilities

II. Intelligence Community

- o Composition and Mission
- o NFIB and Requirements
- o NFIP and Programs
- o CFI and Resource Allocation
- o ICS

III. o CIA

- IV. o Production of National Intelligence
- o Substantive Issues